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ABSTRACT 
 
 Decentralized leadership has become a key facet in the development of a learning 
culture within organizations and industries that sustain successful operations amid high 
levels of risk. Lessons from the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate the 
demand for fluidity to adapt and adjust to complex environments. This in turn has 
required a deviation from the military’s rigid centralized leadership structure, established 
over the last couple of centuries, allowing personnel on the ground and within enemy 
lines the authority to make mission-imperative decisions.  
The mining industry as a whole is faced with similar demands, requiring 
companies to become fluid and establish a learning culture, for success in an era defined 
by increased production, increased environmental responsibility, and lower levels of 
acceptable risk. This thesis investigates the intervention effectiveness of a variant of 
distributive leadership in an underground mining section.  Using leadership traits 
established in a competency model for small unit leaders in the military, section miners 
underwent leadership training and coaching and were then charged with taking over 
decision making processes traditionally performed by the section foreman and fire boss.  
A conclusion of the intervention was difficult to render based on the hypothesis, 
but valuable insights were attained on the application of leadership in underground 
section mining, and for research design improvements in a replication of this study or 
similar studies.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The modern challenges of the mining industry include an array of increasingly 
complex demands. At the forefront of these, miners are expected to maintain or increase 
production output while complying with federal safety regulations, often with an 
organizational expectation of achieving zero harm. The mining industry has made 
progress in defining acceptable risk and reducing fatalities over the last few decades, but 
still faces social and technological challenges, and miners continue to die in coal mines. 
Engineering efforts continue to identify and improve the vast number of systems involved 
in mining; however, a key element of these systems lacks attention.  As the complexities 
of mining continue to increase, additional efforts are necessary to improve the human 
element of mining systems.  
In addition to government safety regulations, the U.S. mining industry has 
adopted behavior-based safety programs aimed at modifying safety culture through 
individual behaviors (Fredrick and Lessin 2010). Some companies in the mining industry 
are taking whole systems design approaches, incorporating safety into an operation’s 
leadership, culture, and systems (Hethmon and Nelson 2013). There is a consensus 
acknowledging the demand for leadership development in mining, and attempts have 
been made to identify useful methods of leadership specific to mining, based on 
traditional leadership models established in academic literature (Mclaggan, Bezuidenhout 
and Botha 2013). Many companies attempt to improve the leadership of their manager
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but seldom in an empirically sound way. Currently there is no known literature 
addressing the intervention effectiveness of different leadership strategies in underground 
section and mining operations. 
During the last decade of global antiterrorism operations, the U.S. Military has 
invested heavily in leadership research and implemented unique operational tactics, 
custom to the demands of modern warfare. In the business world, professionals have 
collaborated with academia to explore new patterns, methods, and components of 
effective leadership, such as leading with emotional intelligence (Goleman 1998), shared 
or distributed leadership (Gronn 2002; Day, Gronn and Salas 2004; Peirce and Conger 
2003), and effects of charismatic, transactional and transformational leadership (Daft 
2015). However, the majority of these studies are specific to education, manufacturing, 
sales, or industrial environments that do not relate closely to mining.   
In over two centuries of warfighting, the U.S. Marine Corps has developed a rigid 
leadership culture, where individual Marines are indoctrinated with basic leadership traits 
and principles that if practiced, enable situational awareness, communication, trust, and 
accountability in small teams. These leadership outcomes serve any organization well, 
but are essential in addressing the hazards associated with underground mining. As both 
the U.S. military and the mining industry have made significant technological advances 
to improve operations over the last century, only the military continually invests in 
leadership.   
Numerous parallels between U.S. military and mining operational risk and 
cultures, and provide a platform in establishing leadership competencies suitable for the 
mining industry. In the U.S. Marine Corps, it is not uncommon to see a 19-year old Lance 
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Corporal with six months of training, be responsible for a multimillion dollar weapons 
system. In the same sense, the mining industry employs hourly personnel, typically with 
secondary education to run and maintain operational-dependent equipment such as a haul 
truck or longwall shearer, both worth millions of dollars. Individual responsibilities in 
both cases will only increase as technology advances.  
Success in modern warfare requires a higher level of individual technical 
proficiency and situational awareness. Individuals must think quickly on their feet, 
making life and death decisions in seconds. Typical training on conventional warfare 
tactics has been completely revamped to provide individuals with a higher level of basic 
skill sets. Core leadership principles are embedded with this technical training and 
standardized during the team building process.  Some of these core leadership principles 
may transfer effectively into mining applications.  
 
1.1  Statement of Problems 
 
Aside from mining, organizations who operate successfully amid extremely 
hazardous conditions and catastrophic consequences of failure (i.e., in refining processes) 
are known as High Reliability Organizations (HROs). HROs have established industry 
wide standards for error-free health, safety, and environmental (HSE) performance 
(Lekka and Hill, 2011).  These organizations exceed the demands of compliance to 
consider the complexity of modern operations and their stakeholders, to generate 
evolving systems, a just and learning culture, and shared and mindful leadership. 
Currently, there is no consensus for a leadership standard in the mining industry. 
Also, there is no consensus leadership strategy for influencing positive change in mining 
culture, increased efficiency in mining systems, adaptation to complexity, and prevention 
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of catastrophes. The interdependence of leadership, culture, and systems is viewed by 
some in industry as the optimal fame work operational excellence, especially in high-risk 
industries (Hethmon and Nelson 2013). This research is intended to contribute to the 
formalization of a leadership standard in the mining industry.  
As mentioned, a holistic approach to improving systems has gained momentum in 
other industries (Charnley et al. 2011) and in general business modeling. However, in 
mining, these holistic approaches are limited to mitigating financial risk and have not 
been normalized in addressing technical failures, political, economic, and social issues or 
health and safety issues. The mining industry as a whole continues with reductionist 
methods of problem solving and systematic analysis, because for generations, engineers, 
scientists, and managers prepared themselves to solve complex problems by becoming 
increasingly specialized and reducing problems to their constituent parts and focusing 
their attention on each part (Charnley et al. 2011). Engineers and designers are no longer 
trained across fields, and thus, no longer keep up with the latest breakthroughs in every 
field (Stasinopoulos et al. 2009).  
 
1.2 Thesis Objective 
 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate leadership applications in the mining 
industry. Beyond that, it is an effort to build on current leadership practice in mining for 
the holistic approach to systems design, which considers leadership, systems, and culture 
(Hethmon and Nelson 2013); see Figure 1.1. 
The exponential growth of complexity, operational demands, economic 
fluctuation, and enterprise risk, require engineers to come better equipped to hurdle the 
mining industry’s challenges.  This research and similar efforts are valuable to the mining 
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industry and safety critical organizations as the groundwork for a leadership standard is 
established and integrated into academic curriculum, engineering practice, and mining 
operations to produce a safer more productive mining industry.  
 
6 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Leadership, Culture and Systems Framework
Leadership  
Culture 
Systems 
  
2. LEADERSHIP THEORY 
  
 
2.1 Paradigms and Levels of Leadership Conceptualization 
Leadership theory has evolved over the last century. Where leadership traits were 
once considered instilled at birth and manifested through heroic figures, it is now 
commonly accepted that principles (skills) of leadership can be learned (Daft 2015, 
Goleman 1998, Northouse 2013). Research in leadership theory has expanded to such a 
degree that today it is conceptualized in many different ways. For example, one author 
may describe several general approaches to leadership that contain subcategories of 
leadership styles, further divided into leadership models, consisting of specific leadership 
competencies. Others may label such a leadership model as its own general approach 
(Daft 2015, Northouse 2013). In application there is some ambiguity as multiple 
approaches to leadership are effective and a specific model of leadership can represent a 
general approach. In well-executed leadership, these theoretical concepts are refined by 
the user. See Figure 2.1 for an image of leadership conceptualization.  
 
2.2 Traditional Leadership Approaches 
 
A majority of leadership literature has been focused on traditional leader-follower 
transactions with a hierarchical structure and with a central leader at each level (Gronn 
2002). Two main ideas under this paradigm include the resonant and dissonant 
approaches. The main difference between these two approaches is in the way that a leader
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interacts with followers. The resonant approach includes visionary, coaching, affiliative, 
and democratic styles of leadership, which in all cases require the leader’s investment in 
followers. The dissonant approach to leadership includes pacesetting and commanding 
styles. These styles may include a harsh interface between the leader and follower, but 
can be useful or necessary under certain circumstances, particularly where a specific set 
of standards must be upheld and where leader-follower transactions involve strict 
obedience (Daft 2015).  
Other traditional concepts in leadership research include the trait and skills 
approaches. The trait approach has been the most refined and studied approach over the 
last century. However, the trait approach stems from the “great man” theory of 
leadership, where different qualities were observed in successful military, religious, and 
political leaders, then outlined as “traits” that may qualify someone to be a natural born 
leader (Northouse 2013). The skills approach is similar in that it outlines necessary skills 
to be a successful leader, but assumes that most skills can be learned. Both of these 
approaches are still utilized, specifically in the military. Though dated, these approaches 
provide a strong introduction to basic leadership principles, which serves as a platform as 
individuals develop leadership styles. 
 
2.3 Contemporary Leadership Approaches 
 
Contemporary leadership approaches have stemmed from the demands of 
complexity in organizations world-wide and are being applied at multiple organizational 
levels. Again, different approaches to leadership are defined based on leader-follower 
transactions and still fall under the paradigm of a hierarchical (focused) leadership 
structure with a central leader. In general, these approaches include moral and servant 
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leadership, leading through power, and leading through influence. The transactional, 
transformational, charismatic, and coalitional models of leadership, represent the various 
approaches and models of influential leadership (Daft 2015). Certain leadership 
approaches and models may be more effective than others based on operational demands, 
culture, and employee skill levels. A transformational leader is most effective at aligning 
his or her subordinates (or peers) towards a certain vision, while a transactional leader is 
more focused on getting subordinates to accomplish a task, through a process of 
transactional compromise, i.e., simply paying an employee the agreed wage for 
completion of a certain task.   
 
2.4 Leading vs. Managing in Mining 
 
There is no consensus leadership model in the mining industry, as different 
applications of mining may require more than one particular approach to leadership in 
order to effectively reach production and safety goals. When mining operators do practice 
a regular form of leadership, it is typically one in the traditional hierarchical leadership 
structure and transactional. In cases where there is a void in leadership, an operation 
relies on routine planning, organizing, staffing, and controlling, all basic functions of 
management (Northouse 2013). Establishing standard operating procedures or regulations 
can improve work environments, but do not entirely account for the complexities of 
mining operations or the human element of mining systems. It is important to distinguish 
between the functions of management and leadership, with management’s role being to 
provide order and consistency to an organization while leadership provides change and 
movement. The concept of leadership has been explored dating back to Aristotle, whereas 
management was created more recently in the industrial revolution, to prevent chaos in 
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the workplace (Northouse 2013). A good leader must grasp and execute both concepts.  
 
2.5 Distributive, Shared, and Participative Leadership 
 
In underground section coal mining, multiple hazards require individual miners to 
be aware of their surroundings, to be technically proficient, and to communicate 
efficiently with their fellow miners. In an application where such a mix of independence 
is required, leadership could be viewed as a relational phenomenon, where formal leaders 
and followers share in the process of enacting leadership (Drath 2001). This pattern of 
leadership, being spread or shared across a group rather than coming from a central 
figure, was first noticed by the Australian leadership theorist C.A. Gibb in the 1950s, and 
is most often referred to as distributive leadership (Gronn 2002). This structure of 
leadership relies on strong individual capabilities, yet promotes cohesion through 
interdependence and accountability as individual group members conform to standards. 
Pearce and Conger in the book Shared Leadership: Reframing the Hows and 
Whys of Leadership, define shared (distributive) leadership as “a dynamic interactive 
influence process among individuals in groups, for which the objective is to lead one 
another to the achievement of group or organizational goals or both” (Pearce and Conger 
2003). Because distributive (shared) leadership represents an entirely different structure 
of leadership processes, as compared to the traditional hierarchical leadership structure, 
individuals may adopt leadership competencies from transactional, transformational, 
coalitional, and several other leadership models (Hoch, Pearce and Welzel 2010); see 
Figure 2.1.  
Carson, Tesluk and Marrone (2007), define distributive or shared leadership as 
“an emergent property that results from the distribution of leadership across multiple 
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team members; it represents a condition of mutual influence embedded in the interactions 
among team members that can significantly improve team organization and 
performance.” Their study draws attention to this important “property” of distributive 
leadership, where leadership acts as a team output and feeds back into the cycle of a 
leadership culture.  This theme reoccurs in a discussion of the processes of teaming and 
the leadership capacity of teams (Day et al. 2004), where instead of acting only as an 
input, in the linear Input-Process-Output (I-P-O) model of teaming leadership is the input 
and output of a cyclic-process described with the acronym; inputs, mediational 
influences, outcomes, inputs (IMOI). In this situation, leadership is not only an input, but 
a by-product of the interaction among teammates that feeds back into the cyclic-process, 
harnessing a leadership culture within the team and increasing the overall leadership 
climate. 
 
2.6 Distributive Leadership vs. Self-Managing Teams 
 
The outcomes of distributive leadership and self-managing teams draw multiple 
parallels. Literature regarding self-managing (self-directed) teams typically includes 
some discussion of distributive (shared or participative) leadership (Day et al. 2004; 
Hoch et al. 2010; Huang et al. 2009; Manz and Sims 1987; Mehra et al. 2006). Shared 
leadership has also become a discussion in team leadership, where improvements in 
communication and trust are desired outcomes. Though the subjects are closely 
intertwined, distributive leadership involves a spread of influence and self-managing 
teams involve distribution of authority. It is important to note that, distributive leadership 
is applicable to multiple units of analysis, while team leadership is specific to a single 
unit (teams).  
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Figure 2.1 Leadership Theory Conceptualization Model 
  
3. MILITARY LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES IN MINING 
 
3.1 Military Small Teams vs. Underground Coal Mining Section 
Similar to the front line units in a combat environment, miners who work on the 
face of a coal mining section are subject to the majority of hazards associated with 
underground coal mining. Small teams in both environments are the “back bone” of 
operations and rely on efficient teaming processes. Success in both scenarios depend on 
how well the team process is executed, which is determined by the leadership interactions 
among team members.  
There are also parallels in the structure of military infantry units and underground 
mining sections. An underground mining section typically is managed by a foreman who 
is placed according to experience or some level of education, and oversees 8 to 12 
people. The foreman is accompanied by a fire boss, who inspects the mine face and 
assists the foreman with coordinating and directing task between miners. The squad level 
in a Marine infantry unit is supervised by a squad leader, who oversees 10-16 Marines. 
The squad further delegates authority to multiple team leaders, who oversee 3 to 5 
Marines. Team leaders are the lowest level of small unit leadership in the Marine Corps. 
Team leaders must be efficient at both relaying and executing orders from the squad 
leader, while also making life and death decisions. Even at the team leader level, Marines 
are encouraged and empowered to make decisions, but are also held accountable.  
Operationally, both a section foreman and Marine squad leader perform work
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responsibilities independent of the larger organization. This requires a certain level of 
experience, and in the case of a Marine squad leader in combat, certain leadership 
capabilities to motivate subordinates and enable communication. The same leadership 
abilities, are considered in this intervention but will be introduced to all miners in the 
section in addition to the foreman and fire boss. 
 
3.2 Military Leadership and Industry 
 
The U.S. military has been training leaders for about 213 years, dating back to the 
establishment of West Point. Many mistakenly believe that West Point (or sister 
institutions such as the U.S. Naval Academy or U.S. Airforce Academy) prepare leaders 
only for military applications. While many graduates make the military a career, others 
serve their initial five-year active duty obligation, then enter industry or government and 
apply the same skill set. Wendy’s, Johnson & Johnson, Proctor and Gamble, Goodrich 
and Footlocker have all been led by CEOs from one of these military institutions (Winn 
and Banks 2014).  
 
3.3 Leadership Competencies Suitable for Underground Section Mining 
 
The skills and trait approaches are useful in introducing leadership principles to 
individuals with little to no prior experience or training in leadership. Most of the other 
approaches to leadership define specific methods to leader- follower interactions (e.g., 
LMX) where the skills and trait approaches outline individual competencies. The Marine 
Corps operational standard on leadership, Principles of Marine Corps Leadership (RP 
0103) includes 14 leadership traits that underlie 11 leadership principles. These traits and 
principles are included in the standard competency model for each Marine, instilled 
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during boot camp, and then continuously refined.  The following list includes four traits 
and three principles adopted from this publication that are suitable for implementation in 
an underground coal mining section, and feasible for implementing a leadership safety 
program. 
 
3.3.1 Traits 
 
 Judgment – the ability to weigh facts and possible courses of action in order to 
make sound decisions 
 Dependability – the certainty of proper performance of duty 
 Decisiveness – the ability to make decisions promptly and to announce them in a 
clear manner 
 Knowledge – the range of one’s information, including professional knowledge 
and understanding of coworkers  
 
3.3.2 Principles 
 
 Know yourself and seek self-improvement 
 Know your people and look out for their welfare 
 Seek responsibilities and take responsibilities (accountability) 
 
 
 
4. HYPOTHESIS 
 
 
4.1 Role Delineation in Distributive Leadership 
 
Distributive patterns of leadership (i.e., shared, distributive, and participative) can 
be categorized based on the proportional strength of social influence between mangers 
and subordinates, or among peers. A complete distribution of leadership is considered 
“weak” in influence proportion, whereas shared or participative leadership is “strong” 
(Gronn 2002, Shamir 1999). A variant of distributive leadership is anticipated to be 
realistic for implementation in an underground coal mining section; where a social form 
of “division of labor” is feasible in comparison to a complete social and technical 
division of labor, as no new equipment or technologies are expected to be introduced 
(Gronn 2002).  
Traditionally the responsibilities of a section fireboss and foreman parallel those 
of a small unit team leader and a direct “manager.” Typically, the section fire boss 
ensures work flow by directing the task of individual miners and keeping the mine face 
supplied, performs preshift inspections, and reports to the section foreman. Depending on 
how involved a section foreman chooses to be, some responsibilities are interchangeable 
with the fire boss, e.g., the foreman may direct activities on the face, while the fire boss 
performs inspections. A rigid definition of responsibilities depends on the mine 
(organized labor status), the relationship between the fire boss and foreman, and 
experience of miners in a section. In general, the foreman is accountable and responsible
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for section operations and makes decisions as to the order of daily tasks.  
Given that a shift to distributive leadership involves proportions of influence, the 
work tasks and delegated authority associated with the section fire boss and foreman 
positions remain in place. However, as the leadership traits and principles discussed 
previously are standardized among all crewmembers, some level of authority should be 
shared so that individuals participate in the decision-making process. In a study of 
external leadership in self-managing teams, positions traditionally held by the foreman 
were filled by a “coordinator” (Manz and Sims 1987). Because the concept of “self-
managing teams” involves a complete shift in authority (opposed to influence) to all team 
members, it is not completely applicable in practicing distributive leadership; however, 
the section foreman does need to adopt some functionalities of a “coordinator” while 
crew members participate in the decision-making process. This study is intended to 
validate that an increase in leadership climate through distributive leadership will affect 
the psychological empowerment of individual miners. 
 
4.2 Psychological Empowerment 
 
Psychological empowerment has been conceptualized as a multidimensional 
construct consisting of (a) impact, i.e., degree to which an employee feels his or her work 
affects an organization, (b) competence, i.e., perceived ability to accomplish work-related 
task, (c) meaningfulness, i.e., intrinsic caring about work task, and (d) choice, i.e., 
perceived self-determination or autonomy (Kirkman and Rosen 1997, 1999; Spreitzer 
1995; Thomas and Velthouse 1990). Different perspectives on empowerment were 
sought by (Thomas and Velthouse 1990) to distinguish between situational attributes (i.e., 
management practices) and job incumbent cognitions about those attributes (e.g., 
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psychological empowerment). This work provides a more precise definition of 
empowerment and differentiate between psychological empowerment and structural 
empowerment (i.e., the delegation of authority and responsibility to employees). This 
concept is important because “psychological empowerment has been shown to transform 
individual behaviors above and beyond the capabilities of structural empowerment alone” 
(Wallace et al. 2011).   
 
4.2.1 Hypothesis0 
Ho: An increase in leadership climate through training and implementation of a 
variant of distributive leadership correlates to a positive change in psychological 
empowerment among individual miners in an underground coal mining section.  
 
4.3 Situational Awareness 
 
The essential ability to “see – anticipate – avoid” peril was identified by teams of 
researchers addressing critical contexts like air combat, space shuttle, and nuclear plant 
operations among others, as the ability of the individual to respond safely and 
competently with preventative actions in a timely manner. The phrase “situational 
awareness” (SA) was coined in the late 1960s and is generally defined as the person’s 
ability to perceive, understand and project outcomes in what goes on around them 
(Rosenweg, 2001). (Endsley 1995) further defined situational awareness as: 
a. Perception - Seeing. The first step in achieving SA involves accurately seeing 
what is going on around you, what the people, equipment, and systems are 
doing as well as any incoming information.  
b. Comprehension - Understanding. Perception is followed by understanding 
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the situation elements with respect to the operating goals, to form a total 
picture of the environment.  
c. Projection - Thinking ahead. The capacity to project the future actions or 
outcomes of the elements in the environment, at least in the short term.  
  
4.3.1 Hypothesis1 
 
H1: An increase in psychological empowerment correlates positively to a change 
in productivity, perception towards safety and situational awareness among individual 
miners in an underground coal mining section.
 
 
 
5. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
This study assesses the intervention effectiveness of a variant of distributive 
leadership with confidential perception surveys and safety and production outcome 
measures, using a quasi-experimental design. The intervention involves two phases with 
a cohort of two continuous miner production crews (one intervention crew and one 
control crew) over a 60-day period. An underground, nonunion coal mine in central Utah 
agreed to serve as the study partner, allowing access to two production crews and any 
related production and safety data generated relative to the crews through the duration of 
the study.  
 
5.1 Methods 
 
Because the two participating crews were selected by mine management, the 
study design is quasi-experimental. Threats to internal validity relative to this quasi-
experiment include the history threat, i.e., changes in work processes, pace or structure, 
testing threat, i.e., changes that occur because the test was performed, placebo threat, i.e., 
a psychological mechanism when participants indicate change though no change has been 
implemented, Hawthorne threat, i.e., changes behavior due-to the presence of researchers, 
and the dropout threat, i.e., where participants choose not to follow through with the 
study. Internal validity specific to control groups includes the regression-to-the-mean- 
interaction threat, i.e., where the participants are selected based on need, diffusion threat, 
i.e., where the intervention leaks into control groups, and the rivalry threat, i.e., where
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control groups make changes in a competitive effort against the intervention group 
(Robson et al. 2001). To ensure viability of the data and to maintain a quasi-experimental 
standard, data were collected from a control crew who received no training or 
intervention, this effort was included specifically to control the history effect.  
For logistical reasons, a weekend crew (three, 13.5 h shifts) was selected as the 
intervention crew, and the control group, a week-day crew (five, 8 h swing/grave shifts). 
In order to reasonably compare production data and other data affected by specific mine-
section conditions, both crews were mining the Three Right-West Lease Four 
development section.  This assisted in minimizing the Hawthorne effect and control the 
validity threats specific to control groups (Robson et al. 2001). Additional outcome 
measures were included in the surveys to determine if the intervention was or was not 
effective.  
A legitimate time series design was not feasible because the study was limited to 
60 days and the use of multiple measurements were limited because the surveys required 
substantially more time to complete than was anticipated. A mid-intervention 
measurement was taken but did not include the situational safety awareness test. The test 
took some miners over an hour too complete and heavily impacted the logistics of getting 
all miners to the section in the same trip, as well as rotating on and off tasks if miners 
took the test underground. A journal of the intervention was utilized to supplement the 
data collected, while also identifying any dropout or history effects. The additional 
outcome measures assisted in controlling the history, Hawthorne and placebo effects; see 
Figure 5.1.  
The cohort consisted of two continuous miner production crews, with one 
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designated to undergo the leadership intervention, in the form of leadership training, 
observations and coaching. Both crews participated in the surveys. Each crew consisted 
of approximately 8-11 miners.  
The training was implemented in two phases. In phase one, the section fire boss 
and foreman were instructed on the functions of distributive leadership, and received 
training and instruction on the basic leadership competencies mentioned in the previous 
section in the leadership background, and military leadership competencies suitable for 
mining. A pocket guide called the “Miners Guide to Shared Leadership” was developed 
for the intervention and utilized both as a reference and training tool, see Appendix A for 
the “Miners Guide to Shared Leadership.” The foreman and fire boss were the first to 
receive training and complete a personal action plan, which included an inventory of the 
skills and competencies in which they were efficient, and those that needed improvement. 
After determining the skills each needed to improve, learning tools were provided in the 
form of reading materials, as well as coaching.  
 
5.1.1 Phase One of the Intervention 
 
During phase one of the intervention, an attitude consensus was observed, which 
is explained later in the analysis. The foreman then participated in the decision of how to 
delegate leadership to his crew. This was considered an important aspect of the 
intervention, as it allowed for the crew to take ownership of the change. Before 
leadership was handed over, each miner in the crew spent 2 to 5 hours receiving 
instruction on leadership competencies using the “Miners Guide to Shared Leadership,” 
discussing the overall morale and leadership climate at the mine, and discussing their 
own perceived leadership abilities. 
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After each crew member received leadership training and instruction, the foreman 
was encouraged to lead a discussion with the crew to determine a set of core values, a 
vision, and goals, specific to their mining section. This was used to generate a standard to 
which individuals could hold each other accountable.  
 
5.1.2 Phase Two of the Intervention 
 
Phase two of the intervention involved reorganization of the crew’s leadership. 
During this phase, the foreman and fire boss distributed the traditional functions of 
leadership allowing individual crew members to participate in the leadership process, i.e., 
directing tasks. This phase of the intervention included follow-up training, observations, 
and coaching as needed, and heavily relied on the ability of the foreman and fire boss to 
encourage individual leadership. Simultaneously with this transition, crew members 
continued to identify their personal leadership skills and seek improvement. Training was 
provided one to two times a weekend during this phase in the form of instruction and  
coaching, to ensure individual crew members had the assets necessary to improve their 
individual leadership skills. See Figure 5.2 for a process flow diagram of the intervention. 
  
5.2 Measures 
 
Baseline and postintervention perception surveys were adopted from validated 
questionnaires and supplemented with semi structured interviews, observations, and 
safety and production data provided by the mine. Two surveys were distributed before, 
during, and after the intervention. A general miner perception survey integrated questions 
measuring leadership climate and psychological empowerment was distributed first, 
followed by a survey measuring situational safety awareness.  
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Psychological Empowerment was measured using a 12-item, 5-point Likert scale 
instrument (5=strongly agree, 4= agree, 3= neutral, 2= disagree, 1= strongly disagree) 
adopted from Gretchen Spreitzer’s research on “Empowerment in the Workplace” 
(Spreitzer 1995). Questions from this work were integrated into the general miner survey.  
Situational Awareness was measured using the Situational Safety Awareness 
Inventory, Questionnaire V5.0p, provided by Psyfactors, Pty Ltd. The survey is 
specifically directed at measuring situational awareness in mobile equipment operators in 
the mining industry. This was a pen and paper version of the instrument, thus allowing 
miners to complete the survey in between tasks underground. The survey took miners in 
both crews an extensive amount of time, i.e., 45 – 85 min to complete, so it was only 
used as a base line and postintervention measurement.  
The survey consisted of 115 questions measuring (1) perception, (2) 
comprehension, and (3) projection. In a sample size of N=15,444 the questionnaire was 
validated with a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.89, with p<0.05. The measurement criteria 
consisted of positive coping skills, mental alertness, manages fatigue, general hazard 
awareness, perception and comprehension, defensive safety habits, safety self-awareness, 
responsible for safety, risk avoidance, safety conscientiousness, and team and safety 
orientation. Each respondent remained anonymous for the protection of his or her 
identity. In a future study, it is recommended that each of the respondents receive an alias 
for the questionnaire to assist in providing better feedback to individuals who participate 
in the study, improve the efficiency of data collection, and quality of the overall analysis. 
A group average was calculated and compared against the average taken from 
respondents reporting <10% safety incidents over a 14-month period. 
25 
 
 
Leadership climate was measured using the following subvariables; trust, 
communication, innovation, task proficiency, and dependability. These variables were 
combined into 17 previously validated questions. These questions were included in the 
general miner survey, using a 5 point Likert scale (5=strongly agree, 4= agree, 3= neutral, 
2= disagree, 1= strongly disagree). Reference Table 5.1 for a list of the different data 
sources.  
 
5.3 Analysis of Survey Responses 
 
Quantitative and qualitative forms of analysis are useful to analyze the study data, 
considering the range of data and the sample size restriction. Supplemental data were 
collected through interviews and observations in the form of an intervention journal. This 
enabled a more thorough interpretation of the numeric data, e.g., it is possible that 
production levels decreased because of the holiday schedule over the months of 
November and December, 2015. In this regard, a strict quantitative analysis alone is less 
reliable for interpreting the collected data or validating the proposed hypothesis.  
 In the case that this study is replicated with 145 or more participants, the design is 
sufficient for using a form of multivariable analysis to analyze correlations among the 
variables in hypothesis one, and multivariate analysis, i.e., linear regression or 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) for hypothesis two. A larger number of 
participants will also provide statistical significance for using factor analysis to group the 
variables associated with the leadership climate, situational awareness, and safety 
constructs and use of the p-value, confidence intervals or two-sample t-Test, to validate 
the overall intervention effectiveness (Robson et al.). 
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Table 5.1 Data Sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source Outcome Measurement  
Perception 
Surveys 
Leadership Climate, Psychological Empowerment, Situational 
Awareness 
Semi-structured 
Interviews 
Leadership Climate, Psychological Empowerment, Safety Climate 
Observations Leadership Climate, Safety Culture, Psychological Empowerment 
Safety Data Safety Perception Survey and Reportable Safety Data 
Production Data Productivity, Group Efficiency 
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Figure 5.1 Quasi-Experimental Controls  
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6. ANALYSIS 
 
 
In this study the number of participants (i.e., N=9), was useful for gaining insight 
on the topic but insufficient to achieve statistical power to validate the data collected 
through the perception survey responses. A larger more randomly selected cohort, (i.e., 
the whole mine or multiple crews) would provide the number of participants needed to 
show significance and justification for the use of a form of multivariate analysis. 
Multivariate analysis is useful for research with this design, where implementation of a 
general concept such as leadership climate, requires manipulation of multiple control 
variables (i.e., independent variables) which are measured against a small or lesser 
number of intended outcomes (i.e., dependent variables).   
To supplement the surveys, data were collected in the form of discussions, 
interviews, and an intervention journal. This analysis contains both a quantitative and 
qualitative summary of the data collected. Each phase of the intervention is discussed 
along with any corresponding subjects and the data from the perception surveys and the 
situational awareness survey.   
 
6.1 Intervention Notes, Discussions, and Interviews 
 
The following includes notes from the discussions, interviews, and intervention 
journal starting with a preintervention phase, phase one and, phase two.
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6.1.1 Preintervention and Overall Culture of the Mine 
There was a certain bias introduced prior to beginning the intervention, as the 
mine operator’s shift supervisors decided upon the cohort. Specifically, the intervention 
crew was chosen based on need for development and, a hope that the training would 
improve their overall attitude. For the changes caused by the intervention to be observed 
in a comparative analysis and to address the regression to the mean threat to validity, the 
study design included a nonintervention crew, who did not undergo leadership training or 
reorganization. The nonintervention crew did participate in the surveys. 
The intervention crew’s fire boss was assigned specifically to the crew to assist 
the foreman with work flow, because of the crew’s unsatisfactory performance and poor 
attitude, but not lack of experience. He had approximately 15 years of experience with 5 
to 7 years as a fire boss. He typically managed work flow in the section by 
micromanaging and pace setting, which for the circumstances was effective to keep the 
section moving forward. This was problematic for the implementation of shared 
leadership.   
The section foreman was previously assigned to another crew who had worked 
and performed well together. His previous crew functioned autonomously, similar to  
other sections at the mine (to include the intervention crew), but more within his 
performance standards and values. This allowed the foreman to focus on tasks 
specifically related to his position and communicate with the shift supervisor, so that little 
to no leadership skills were required, only simple management of the section. 
The mining section where the intervention and nonintervention crews operated 
was 4,500 feet behind schedule and next in sequence to be mined by the longwall. The 
30 
 
 
conditions in the section were typical for the mine with an 8 to 9-ft mining height, regular 
ground water, shale top, and approximately 900 ft of overburden* There were occasional 
sets of faults which required additional roof support (trusses) and time for installation, 
but, in general, sequencing was normal.  
Most equipment was worn down but functional with regular maintenance. It was 
noticed during the first section visit of the intervention that a screw driver was jammed 
into the reset button on the feeder breaker. This was to override a tripper that caused the 
feeder to continuously power down and required the shuttle car drivers to dismount and 
reset the feeder breaker before offloading coal.  
Weekend shifts at the mine consisted of production crews for each section and the 
longwall, and a single maintenance crew on grave-yard shift. During the week, 
production crews mined through the swing and grave shifts, while a down shift advanced 
the section during the day. The intervention was granted initiation three weeks after the 
completion of a longwall move, and just before the end of the year when employees are 
encouraged to use up annual vacation. Upon completion of the intervention, the mine 
schedule was set to be reorganized to an industrial schedule, with redistribution of some 
crew members and shifts. Typically, MSHA** did not show up during the weekend shifts, 
and if they did it was during the day, Friday, on the first shift. 
The mine operator compensates hourly employees based on a three-level pay 
scale (A, B, and C) with C-pay (i.e., approximately $23.75 per hour), for entry level 
____________________ 
*Overburden is the depth of material from the top of the seam being mined to the surface 
above. 
 
**MSHA is an abbreviation for Mine Safety and Health Administration, the regulatory 
agency for mining in the United States. 
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miners, usually raised to B-pay within the first 18 months of employment. B-pay is the 
standard pay (i.e., approximately $26.75 per hour) for underground miners until they are 
promoted to a certain job (i.e., roof bolter, miner operator, etc.) entitled to A-pay (i.e., 
approximately $29.75 per hour). There are also shift differentials for working production 
on swing shifts, graveyards, and weekends. Foreman, managers, safety personnel, and 
engineers are paid on a salary basis.   
The mine operator currently affects a large number of stakeholders locally, 
nationally, and internationally. The mine and a few other sister mines are corporate run 
from another state and regularly export coal overseas. Mine management (both upper and 
lower) are primarily tenure employees. Most of the mine shift and section front line 
supervisors are tenured as well. In many cases, multiple family members are employed at 
the mine, which has some effect on the hiring, firing, and promotional processes. During 
preintervention interviews, miners expressed frustration with management for hiring 
nonlocal employees who were absorbed after the closure of a sister mine.  
The mine has had a strong reputation for safety over the last decade, using a 
seasoned behavior-based safety program. In the prior year, they accomplished 1,000,000 
man hours of no-reportable injuries. Employees were awarded with a monthly safety and 
production bonus which accrued during long periods of no-reportable injuries, and at 
times reached 15%-30% of the miner’s monthly income. After a reportable injury 
occurred, the bonus dropped to zero, then accrued again as no injuries were reported.  
Within 3 weeks of the 1,000,000-man hour record (the prior year), 3 separate lost 
time injuries were reported, resulting in 2 miners experiencing severed fingers and one 
miner obtaining a bruised rib and a hip, from a blast during initial caving on the longwall. 
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At the start of the intervention, a year and a half after the reportable incidents, the safety 
and production bonus had only accrued to approximately 2%–5% of monthly income for 
miners. Miners expressed frustration with the decrease in their monthly bonus, as they 
had grown accustomed to it during the previous years. Frustration was fueled by a 
decrease in monthly bonuses and an increased push for production during the previous 
year. This had a significant negative impact on the culture of the section. More interviews 
and data would be useful to determine a mine-wide consensus of this issue. 
A consensus was revealed during the interviews that safety management and 
operations management were not interdependent and lacked communication. While safe 
behavior was considered an obvious priority to all miners, front line supervisors were 
under strong pressure to boost production. For the miners, there appeared to be a certain 
amount of confusion to whether safe procedures or production goals were the priority.  It 
is possible that this issue exceeds the level of upper management and correlates more 
directly with corporate leadership. More data could be useful to determine this. Overall, 
the mine’s general management indicated a positive attitude towards safety. 
 
6.1.2 Phase One of the Intervention 
 
The intervention crew typically received training during one entire shift over the 
three weekend shifts (Friday–Sunday, 11:00 am – 12:45am). Due to limited resources, 
training was less rigorous and depended on availability of crew members. The foreman 
made instructional periods a priority, but one-on-one instructional sessions were time 
consuming (2 to 4 h) and limited the number of miners to be trained during the 13.5-h 
shift. This created conflicts in the overall project schedule when miners scheduled for 
training during the next weekend called in sick or took vacation. Adjustments were made 
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to handle these schedule conflicts, but some delays were inevitable. Generally, the 
training was well-received among members of the crew.  
Phase one of the intervention was initiated with a series of interviews, 
discussions, and instructional sessions with the section foreman and fireboss. The section 
foreman was ambitious to improve his personal leadership skills and eager for other 
miners in the section to undergo training. The section foreman and fireboss were 
provided with an instructional manual which included leadership principles, the structure 
of shared leadership, a personal action plan outline, process improvement procedures, 
hazard analysis procedures and guidelines to their role in shared leadership. The manual, 
“Foreman’s Guide to Shared Leadership,” proved to be a useful tool throughout the 
intervention. It was created for the project and written in a language specific to an 
underground mining section.  
The foreman who was naturally quiet, agreed that it was a priority to improve his 
communication skills. As a first step, different methods and forms of giving feedback 
were discussed (i.e., to groups, individuals, positive feedback, and negative feedback) 
and practiced. The foreman was also coached in leading a few discussions with the 
section, mainly to develop a short-term vision for the crew, a set of values, a set of goals, 
and a plan for their implementation. The initial training and instructional period was 
followed by weekly discussions and coaching through the duration of the intervention. 
The foreman saw value in having each miner undergo the same amount of instruction and 
training. He was supportive by allowing miners to pause work for instructional periods, 
coaching, and discussions.  
The section fire boss underwent the same training and participated in follow up 
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sessions. He was receptive to the training, but frequently used the discussion time to 
elaborate on frustrations with management and the poor performance and attitudes of the 
miners in the section. The fire boss was an effective pace-setting leader. Pace setting 
leaders are beneficial for driving production, but may be prone to overlook process 
safety. The fire boss’s pace setting leadership style proved to be a hurdle in implementing 
and nourishing the shared leadership structure, mainly because it was so effective under 
the current circumstances and cultural climate.  
A few weeks into phase one of the intervention, each miner in the section 
completed initial training. An edited form of the instructional guide, “Miner’s Guide to 
Shared Leadership,” was given to each miner along with a wet-erase pen, to record notes 
and complete a personal action plan. During the completion of training, a majority of the 
miners were receptive to the information and maintained a positive attitude while 
completing the personal action plan.  
Most miners used the discussion time to express concerns with current 
management, a negative cultural climate across the mine, frustration with the foreman for 
lack of feedback, the negative political climate towards coal, and the negative outlook on 
the future of the industry. However, after discussing these frustrations, most of the miners 
quickly moved on to the leadership material and foresaw the benefits of leadership 
applications in their daily routines and even personal lives. 
The introduction of the shared leadership manual first provides a comparison 
between a fixed mindset to a growth mindset. Most of the miners agreed that previously 
they had approached each day with a fixed mindset, and agreed on the benefit of 
attempting to operate in a growth mindset. Transformation into a growth mindset can be 
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challenging as an individual, but less so as a team. This proved to be beneficial as all 
miners in the crew actively participated in the intervention. The review of possible 
mindsets was also a beneficial transition into the instructional material.  
Each miner displayed an understanding of the leadership principles. While 
discussing these, a majority of the miners identified the items that needed improvement 
as a crew, but had difficulty in addressing items they could improve as individuals. This 
opened the discussion to clarify the difference between accountability and responsibility. 
Accountability, a desired quality sought by many superiors, is difficult to obtain 
from employees on a voluntary basis. During this discussion, one of the miners was 
hesitant to take accountability for his responsibilities after being locked into B-pay for 
over 5 years, while the other crew members were earning A-pay, and he was capable of 
fulfilling the same responsibilities. It was a difficult subject to argue. The benefit of 
taking accountability was presented as self-satisfying. This was a highly optimistic 
solution, but reasonable suggestions were limited in this discussion. The miner had no 
prior feedback on his performance or goals set by supervisors to achieve the next level of 
pay. 
During the instructional periods, miners discussed their overall role in the section 
as well as their individual responsibilities (i.e., roof bolter, miner operator, third man, 
shuttle car driver, and mechanic). For routine tasks, miners completed workflow 
diagrams to pinpoint normalization of deviance and look for more efficient, safer steps to 
complete each task. The discussion of these routine activities brought light to several 
process where improper procedures or short cuts have become acceptable, and where 
additional actions should be implemented for overall improvement. This was a useful 
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exercise for individual proficiency. Phase one was primarily instructional, except for 
coaching received by the foreman. In phase two, the section introduced leadership 
reorganization.  
 
6.1.3 Phase Two of the Intervention 
 
After each miner completed the initial training and the foreman and fire boss were 
instructed regarding their role in the shared leadership structure, phase two of the 
intervention was initiated. This occurred four weeks into the intervention. In phase two, 
the follow-up discussions with each miner, the foreman, and the fire boss continued. 
During the transition to phase two, the miner section was down due to a series of faults 
and the section belt being torn in half.  The fire boss reported that the section was still 
behind approximately 4,500 ft.  
As a daily routine and at the beginning of each shift, the section foreman would 
briefly review over the daily agenda with the crew and relay any special instructions from 
the shift supervisor. For example, this could be an order to advance the section belts and 
power, rather than mine coal, or to install a particular pump, or to build a seal. The 
miners would eat, gather equipment, and dress in rain gear during this time, over 
approximately 25-35 min, then walk to their respective equipment on the face. Because 
MSHA was not likely to show up during the weekend shifts, required preshift inspections 
on equipment were not completed regularly. The fire boss would accompany miners to 
the face, provide each miner with specific instructions for those tasks, and then proceed 
to do daily preshifts (i.e., inspections of the face and belt line). Sometimes the preshifts 
would take place after lunch, depending on specific task laid out in the daily agenda.  
With the initiation of phase two, the foreman simply gave an overview of the 
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tasks that needed to be completed at the beginning of each shift as directed from the shift 
supervisor. The miners would then decide who should accomplish each task and when. 
This provided an opportunity for miners to step outside their routine tasks, cross train, 
and improve upon their own skills by training others. 
A significant number of ideas were exchanged and discussed during phase one of 
the intervention, during the one-on-one interviews with the principal; however, miners 
were hesitant to mention the ideas during an initial group discussion in phase two. The 
restricted flow of communication appeared to correlate with a lack of trust between 
miners and the section foreman. In one conversation led by the section foreman after 
initiation of phase two, miners sat quietly at the kitchen table after being asked to discuss 
their ideas for improving the section. Once the conversation was initiated by the 
principle, miners started conversing openly as a group. This initial group discussion was 
used to surface common concerns brought up during the individual interviews in phase 
one, and functioned as an aid to the foreman for use in future group discussions. This was 
a difficult task to accomplish in the intervention but it was pivotal. It was routine for the 
section miners and even the fire boss and foreman to participate in in-depth discussions, 
but rarely was the subject matter related to personal improvement, leadership 
development, or performance as a section. An action plan was agreed upon after the 
discussion to address the common concerns, and implementation of the action plan was 
left to the crew members.   
At the beginning of phase two, the miners were very receptive to the 
reorganization of leadership. The crew agreed that the roof bolters could be more 
productive if they were relieved more frequently. This was achieved by rotating miners 
38 
 
 
off of the roof bolter*** to drive shuttle cars, cross train on the miners, and to complete 
other required tasks in the section, even serving as a third man on the bolter (i.e., bolter 
assistant). Also, there was a secondary roof bolting machine in the section that was put 
into action in the alternate entry, while the primary bolter kept on sequence. This also 
alleviated pressure from the section’s designated roof bolters. The impact of reaching this 
consensus among the miners was significant considering the importance of roof control 
and the poor roof conditions in this section. The action itself was a product of 
communication among the miners (i.e., a leadership trait) rather than a direct result 
leadership reorganization. The decision to focus attention on assisting the roof bolters 
was a byproduct of leadership reorganization and, ultimately, this positively affected the 
section’s roof control.   
At this point in the intervention, the foreman and fire boss noticed improvement 
in the overall attitude of the miners. Some miners went above and beyond their normal 
responsibilities, taking initiative to complete routine tasks without direction, such as 
hanging emergency escape way line as the section advanced and completing other tasks 
during down time that would normally be completed during the down shift. Some  
miners also reported an increase in feedback from the fire boss and foreman. After the 
transition into phase two, interviews and discussions were continued, typically during one 
shift over the three weekend shifts. Coaching was also provided during this time with 
____________________ 
*** Roof bolters are the miners responsible for inserting wire mesh and rebar bolts into the 
mine roof. This is done as control measure, which forms the individual layers of rock above into 
beams that are less likely to cave onto the miners while working. The wire mesh protects miners 
from loose fragments that might fall. Typically roof bolters follow in sequence behind a 
continuous miner. At this mine, the continuous miner was restricted to making 20 foot cuts into 
the coal seam, this required five foot roof bolt intervals. 
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continued observations.  
It was noticed during the second week into phase two, at the beginning of a 
Saturday shift, that the fire boss provided one of the miners with specific directions to a 
simple routine task. He was reminded by the principle of his role in the shared leadership 
structure, and quickly remembered to provide fewer specific instructions. His reminder 
was taken well, this pattern of deviating from the intervention continued through phase 
two without continuous observations because miners schedules were not consistent as 
they were using up year-end vacation. The fire boss frequently returned to his pace-
setting methods of leadership throughout phase two, because the section was still behind 
schedule and being pushed by mine management to increase production.    
As phase two continued, part of the crew used the learning material, coaching, 
instructional time, and reorganization as an opportunity to improve themselves. Down 
time was a pivotal middle ground for development during the intervention, as some 
miners utilized their discretion to complete tasks normally left to the next shift or to avoid 
work. Overall, the crew members reported that they were functioning better as a team and 
that individual miners were more willing to jump in and help each other. Though unity 
and cohesion improved, there was a consensus among the miners that the overall attitude 
towards work and the company showed no significant change.  
The foreman and fire boss were impressed with the overall improvement in 
performance in the section, but mentioned that some miners were not interested in taking 
on the leadership principles, and that individual discretion and authority to make 
decisions provided an excuse for some miners to get out of completing routine tasks.  
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6.2 Analysis of Surveys and Hypothesis0 
 
The miner survey was distributed at the beginning, middle, and end of the 
intervention. The principle investigator administered the beginning and middle surveys, 
and the section foreman administered the postintervention survey. After completion of 
the surveys, each miner returned the survey in a Manilla, nontransparent folder, which 
was collected and filed by the principle investigator. The situational safety awareness 
survey required more time for completion. For this reason, it was collected only two 
times, pre-and postintervention.   
In the analysis of these responses, a table is provided for each category, according 
to the hypothesis. Tables show the number of participants and their responses according 
to the five-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 
5=strongly agree). Radar plots and other graphs are also provided to show changes in 
uniformity of responses, as well as increases and decreases of perception. 
 
6.2.1 Shared Leadership 
 
Because the number of participants was small (N=9), responses could not be 
validated with statistical analysis. The data are still useful in observing some changes in 
overall perception, which was intended to determine effectiveness in implementing the 
shared leadership structure. Table 6.1 is a record of responses from both crews showing a 
mean for each response. Figure 6.1 is a graph of the responses from the intervention 
crew. Figure 6.2 is a graph of responses from the nonintervention crew. Red bars 
represent an increase on the five-point Likert scale and black bars represent a decrease. 
The decrease in perception of shared leadership indicates that the intervention was 
not effectively implemented; see Figure 6.1. As mentioned in section 6.1, the intervention 
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crew was mining on a section that was 4,500 feet behind schedule, next in sequence for 
the longwall, and in need of small unit leadership. The increased pressure to meet 
production goals and overcome leadership deficiencies was a prohibiting factor.  
 Considering the positive reception to the intervention training, the larger decrease 
in perception of shared leadership in the intervention crew over the nonintervention crew 
could prove that miners were more aware of the decision-making processes occurring in 
their section, even though they did not participate as intended in those processes; see 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2. The conclusion includes an elaboration on the possibility of a type II 
error in the statistical analysis as well as other factors which indicate positive changes in 
shared leadership. 
 
6.2.2 Leadership Climate 
The five subcategories in the leadership climate construct included, trust, 
communication, task proficiency, dependability, and accountability. The questionnaire 
contained two to eight questions per item and quantified each item on a five-point Likert 
scale. Because the sample size is small (N=9), a more detailed analysis is provided per 
question used on the survey, rather than any descriptive statistics. A radar plot of survey 
responses to each of these categories, displays the uniformity of survey responses, with 
the control crew and intervention crew side-by-side; see Figures 6.3  – 6.5. The 
preintervention responses are labeled with a light blue color, midintervention with 
orange, and postintervention with grey. The mean Likert score for each question over the 
group of surveys (pre-, mid-, and postintervention) is useful in assessing small changes in 
perception. However, the small sample size correlates to higher standard deviation per 
each question, which prohibits validation of responses using descriptive statistics. 
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Reference Table 6.2 for an overview of the intervention crew statistics and Table 6.3 for 
an overview of the nonintervention crew statistics.  
The radar plot is effective for displaying uniformity, or the lack thereof, as it 
expands, contracts, or scatters. With attention to the demeanor of the question, a positive 
change can be observed with an expansion or contraction of the grey-colored line in each 
plot in comparison to the blue line. It is also useful to look for changes in shape (i.e., 
preintervention responses shaped like a triangle with postintervention responses shaped 
like a circle), to observe any crew-wide consensus of leadership perception. For example, 
a circle with points along the outside ring of the radar plot indicates that all of the 
crewmembers have the same perception regarding that particular question. 
 
6.2.2.1 Trust  
The perception of trust decreased in the intervention crew (3.67-3.41), while 
increasing slightly in the nonintervention crew (3.84-3.85). Trust in the direct supervisor 
increased slightly (2.89-3.00) in the intervention crew. Without validation of the 
perception survey because of the sample size, it is difficult to render a strong conclusion 
strictly from this aspect of leadership climate. See Tables 6.2 and 6.3; also see Figures 
6.3-6.5. 
In reference to the intervention journal, it was noted that some crew members 
were discouraged due to a lack of direction and feedback from the section foreman, and 
showed some level of distrust before the intervention. Section miners were asked to rate 
their own strengths and weaknesses along with the strengths and weaknesses of  their 
peers in a 360° feedback exercise, based on vision, core values, and goals agreed upon as 
a crew (see Figure 6.6). While the vision and values were useful to miners in completing 
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personal action plans, the 360° feedback exercise did not render any useful information as 
responses were uniform and no comments were provided.  
 
6.2.2.2 Proficiency  
Again, there is an overall decrease in perception of proficiency among members 
in the intervention crew, between the preintervention and the postintervention surveys 
(3.93-3.48); see Tables 6.2 and 6.3. In the nonintervention crew, there is a .03 increase 
(3.67-3.70). On the radar plot, there is not only a change in the shape of responses, but 
the size of the radar plot shrinks between the preintervention and postintervention 
surveys, resembling a decrease in the overall perception of proficiency; see Figures 6.7 
and 6.8.  
The questions not only addressed proficiency at the individual level, but also 
inquired if there was encouragement from supervisors or managers to become more 
proficient. This is a good representation of the leadership climate as a whole, because this 
encouragement can come from upper management or from among peers. 
 
6.2.2.3 Dependability  
There was a relatively uniform perception of dependability among members in 
both crews. The 360°-feedback exercise encouraged crew members to take a closer look 
at their own strengths and weaknesses (see Figure 6.9), as well as other crew member’s 
strengths and weaknesses regarding leadership, the established sets of values and goals, 
and their overall proficiency at work. The intervention crew indicated a completely 
uniform perception of familiarity with the strengths and weaknesses of other members in 
their crew after the intervention; see Figure 6.10.  
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6.2.2.4 Accountability  
  Part of the training in the “Miners Guide to Shared Leadership” included an 
explanation of the difference between accountability and responsibility. Responses to the 
questions regarding accountability indicated a slight decrease in perception of 
accountability in both crews; see Figures 6.11 and 6.12.   
 
6.2.2.5 Leadership Climate Summary  
The definition of leadership climate has not been well defined in literature. It 
could be that the definition sits more respectively under organizational culture. For the 
purposes and scope of this study, the leadership climate construct included 
communication, trust, proficiency, dependability, and accountability. All of these hold an 
independent definition and can be found in various categories of literature, but also 
function well together when using the trait theory of leadership to define suitable 
competencies for underground miners. As mentioned in the introduction, the trait theory 
is an efficient method of introducing fundamental leadership principles, but a potential 
step backwards for groups with well-established leadership structures (i.e., the military).  
In accordance with the miner survey, both crews indicated a slightly decreased perception 
of overall leadership climate, though the intervention crew showed more of an overall 
decrease, except for the measurement of dependability, a (.1) increase; see Figures 6.13 
and 6.14. The nonintervention crew showed a .03 increase in proficiency. 
 
6.2.3 Psychological Empowerment 
The psychological empowerment construct consists of (a) impact, i.e., degree to 
which an employee feels his or her work effects an organization, (b) competence, i.e., 
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perceived ability to accomplish work-related task, (c) meaningfulness, i.e., intrinsic 
caring about work task, (d) choice, i.e., perceived self-determination or autonomy 
(Kirkman and Rosen 1997, 1999; Spreitzer 1995; Thomas and Velthouse 1990).  
A sum of the means including all of the items in the psychological empowerment 
construct, i.e., impact, competence, meaningfulness, and choice indicated an overall 
decrease in psychological empowerment from the intervention crew (.14), and a slight  
overall decrease in the nonintervention crew. The intervention crew did indicate an 
increase in impact (.26), and the nonintervention crew indicated a slight increase in 
competence (.15); see Figures 6.15 and 6.16.  
 
6.3 Analysis of Surveys and Hypothesis H1 
 
H1: An increase in psychological empowerment correlates positively to a change 
in productivity, perception towards safety and situational awareness among individual 
miners in an underground coal mining section. 
 
6.3.1 Productivity 
 
Production in tons per hour of run time decreased gradually over the life of the 
intervention; see Figure 6.17. Typically, on days when a drastic decrease in production 
was observed, there were additional tasks that took priority over production, such as 
maintenance on downed equipment. This was the case for both the intervention and 
nonintervention crews; see Figures 6.18 and 6.19.  
Production in tons per shift slightly increased just past the midpoint of the 
intervention, then dropped significantly at the very end; see Figure 6.19 for details. It is 
likely that this was affected by the year-end schedule reorganization, holidays, and 
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encouragement from management to use up remaining vacation days.  
Production in tons per shift for the nonintervention crew showed some increase 
just past the mid-intervention time frame and then decreased; see Figure 6.19. This trend 
is similar to the intervention crew and likely also corresponds to year-end vacation 
consumption and holiday shut downs. 
Production in tons per hour of run time gradually increased for the 
nonintervention crew, then slightly decreased towards the end of the study; see Figure 
6.20.  No trend is visible during the intervention that shows any significant increases or 
decreases from normal production rates, except for the obvious holiday breaks. 
 
6.3.2 Safety 
 
Because the mine had implemented a successful behavior based safety program 
over the last decade, certain questions deem a programmed response. Deviations from 
these expected normal responses that would normally reassure the positive safety culture 
of the section resemble holes in what is thought to be a strong safety culture; see Figures 
6.21-6.28 for a radar plot of survey question responses regarding safety. Responses to 
these questions do not represent a mine consensus, but are insightful to the actual safety 
culture of the section. Responses overall, indicate some positive changes in perception of 
safety among the intervention crew members; see Figure 6.29, and an overall decrease in 
perception of safety among the nonintervention crew members; see Figure 6.30.  There 
was a significant increase in the perception of miners in the intervention crew taking 
responsibility for their own safety. A larger sample size would permit certain regression 
methods to determine any correlation to the leadership competencies learned during the 
intervention. 
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 6.3.3 Situational Awareness 
Safety and situational awareness were measured before and after the intervention. 
Because the measurement tool required a significant amount of time to complete, a mid-
intervention measurement was not taken. In each graph, Group A represents the pre-
intervention survey responses and Group B represents the postintervention responses. 
The surveys were completed with pencil and paper underground, then input to survey 
calculator provided by Psyfactors, Ltd. This measurement tool is intended for use in both 
discerning current employee competencies and as a prescreening for potential employee 
competencies, using the criterion in red as a guideline.  
The instrument was useful for the study, but intended for personnel seeking 
employment, and thus, different attitudes. The survey was long and incorporated 
questions requiring pattern recognition and memory skills to measure perception and 
comprehension. It was observed that some miners lost interest in the content and gave 
minimal effort to completing the survey, knowing that there was no benefit to providing 
correct responses, see perception and comprehension in Figure 6.31. This pattern 
occurred in responses from both the intervention and nonintervention crew. 
The assessment for the nonintervention crew indicated some significant increases 
in mental alertness and safety self-awareness. There were slight increases in managing 
fatigue, responsibility for safety, safety conscientiousness, and team and road safety  
orientation. There was a significant decrease in perception and comprehension, defensive 
safety habits, and general hazard awareness; see Figure 6.32.  
            Responses to the Situational Safety Awareness Assessment in the intervention crew 
indicated a slight decrease in the average level of situational awareness and safety, 
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though there was significant increase in the category of perception and comprehension 
and, a slight increase in defensive safety habits; see Figure 6.33. 
Responses to questions regarding situational awareness on the miner survey 
indicated a slight positive change in routine anticipation of failures for the intervention 
crew; see Figure 6.33 and Table 6.4. There was a slight decrease in perception of 
situational awareness among members in the nonintervention crew, regarding awareness 
of the worst possible risk in the mining section; see Figure 6.34. In general, the responses 
indicated a slight change for one of the questions, and no change regarding situational 
awareness overall.  
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Table 6.1 Survey Questions and Responses Regarding Shared Leadership 
 
 
Questions 
Intervention Crew AVG AVG AVG
Miners in my crew make decisions regarding what needs to get done. 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 3 4.11 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 1 3.22 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 2 3.44
Miners work alone with supervision for the majority of their work shift. 5 2 4 2 4 5 2 4 4 3.56 4 3 3 4 2  - 3 4 4 3.38 2 2 4 4 5 4 2 3 3 3.22
Miners in my section make decisions regarding how things should get done. 4 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 3 3.89 4 1 3 3 4 3 4 3 2 3.00 2 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 2 3.33
Miners in my section make decisions regarding when things should get done. 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3.78 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 3.67 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3.89
Decisions that I make benefit my crew. 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 5 4 4.00 4 3 3 4 2 3 4 3 2 3.11 2 2 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 3.22
Miners in my crew are comfortable making decisions 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3.89 3 3 4 4 2 4 3 2 2 3.00 3 3 3 3 3 4 2 3 2 2.89
My direct supervisor makes all the decisions. 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2.11 2 4 2 3 2 4 3 2 2 2.67 3 3 2 4 3 2 2 2 4 2.72
My direct supervisor is comfortable with change 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 4 2.67 2 2 3 3 4 4 2 4 2 2.89 3 4 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 2.67
I influence the other miners in my section. 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3.89 4 3 3 5 4 3 4 3 5 3.78 4 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3.56
Questions 
Nonintervention Crew
Miners in my crew make decisions regarding what needs to get done. 2 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 3 4.00 4 4 3 2 3 4 5 3 5 3.67 3 4 3 4 4 2 4 3 4 3.44
Miners work alone with supervision for the majority of their work shift. 4 4 3 4 4 3 2 2 2 3.11 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 2 3.22 3 4 3 4 3 2 4 3 3 3.22
Miners in my section make decisions regarding how things should get done. 4 4 3 4 4 3 5 3 4 3.78 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 3.78 3 4 3 4 4 2 4 4 4 3.56
Miners in my section make decisions regarding when things should get done. 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 5 3.78 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 5 4.00 3 4 4 4 2 2 3 5 5 3.56
Decisions that I make benefit my crew. 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 2 4 3.56 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3.67 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3.56
Miners in my crew are comfortable making decisions 3 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3.44 4 4 3 2 4 4 3 3 4 3.44 4 2 3 3 4 3 4 4 3 3.33
My direct supervisor makes all the decisions. 2 3 3 4 2 3 5 3 2 3.00 2 2 4 3 4 2 3 3 3 2.89 3 3 3 3 2 - 2 3 2 2.63
My direct supervisor is comfortable with change 3 2 3 3 4 3 3 5 4 3.33 4 3 4 2 2 4 3 3 4 3.22 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3.11
I influence the other miners in my section. 3 5 5 4 2 3 3 4 5 3.78 4 3 3 4 3 2 4 5 5 3.67 3 4 3 4 2 3 3 5 5 3.56
Preintervention Midintervention Postintervention
Preintervention Midintervention Postintervention
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Table 6.2 Intervention Crew Questions and Responses Regarding Leadership Climate 
 
 
Intervention Crew
Communication AVG AVG AVG
My direct supervisor and I communicate well. 3 3 3 2 2 4 4 4 4 3.22 2 3 3 1 2 4 3 3 2 2.56 1 4 2 4 3 4 2 4 3 3.00
Miners understand what their supervisor expects of them in this section. 4 4 1 4 3 4 4 4 3 3.44 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 3.44 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 3.44
Miners receive regular feedback and coaching from supervisor. 2 1 1 2 2 4 2 2 4 2.22 3 2 2 1 2 3 2 3 2 2.22 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 4 2 2.33
The feedback and coaching received from my supervisor is effective. 3 1 1 2 2 4 2 3 4 2.44 3 3 2 1 2 3 3 3 2 2.44 1 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 2 2.33
Concerns and suggestions are communicated to management when appropriate. 3 3 4 2 4 4 3 3 4 3.33 2 3 3 1 2 4 3 4 2 2.67 4 3 2 3 3 3 2 4 2 2.89
Miners effectively communicate with each other in my section. 3 4 4 2 4 5 4 3 4 3.67 4 3 5 4 4 4 3 3 4 3.78 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 3.67
My direct supervisor keeps miners informed of activities and changes at this mine. 3 3 1 2 4 2 4 4 2.88 4 3 3 1 2 4 3 3 1 2.67 1 2 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 2.33
Trust
I trust my direct supervisor. 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 5 4 2.89 3 3 3 1 3 2 3 4 2 2.67 1 2 2 4 4 3 4 4 3 3.00
Team work is valued to get things done in my section. 5 4 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 4.11 4 3 4 4 4 4 5 2 4 3.78 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 3.56
I trust the miners in my crew. 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 3 3 4.00 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 3 3 4.11 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 2 2 3.67
Proficiency
Miners in my section are encouraged to find better wats to do things. 4 4 1 4 3 4 4 4 4 3.56 2 1 4 3 2 2 4 4 2 2.67 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 2 3.22
Miners in my crew are knowledgeable about their job. 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.11 4 4 3 5 4 5 4 4 4 4.11 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.00
Miners in my section are proficient at their job. 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 3 4.11 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3.78 4 3 4 3 4 4 2 3 2 3.22
Dependability
My crew members can depend on me. 4 2 5 4 5 4 4 5 5 4.22 4 4 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 4.00 4 3 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 4.11
I am familiar with the strengths and weakness of my crew members. 2 3 4 5 3 4 4 4 4 3.67 4 4 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 4.00 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.00
Accountability
I am held accountable for my responsibilities. 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 3.78 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 2 4 3.89 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 3.67
Everyone in my section is held accountable for their responsibilities. 4 4 2 4 3 4 3 3 2 3.22 4 4 3 4 4 2 4 2 2 3.22 3 3 4 4 2 3 2 2 2 2.78
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Table 6.3 Nonintervention Crew Questions and Responses Regarding Leadership Climate 
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Figure 6.1 Intervention Crew Changes in Perception of Shared Leadership  
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Figure 6.2 Nonintervention Crew Changes in Perception of Shared Leadership
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Figure 6.3 I Trust My Direct Supervisor 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Teamwork is Valued to Get Things Done in My Section 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 I Trust the Miners in My Crew 
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Vision  
This crew will be the safest, well-skilled crew that anyone would want to be a part of.  
Values 
Always watch out for each other. 
Communicate with each other efficiently and effectively.  
Always be willing to jump in and help each other out.  
Always do the job right.  
Keep a positive attitude. 
Goals  
Safety-No Injuries 
Production- Exceed the monthly budget 
Leave the section in better condition than it was handed over (Could be a value) 
 
  
 
Figure 6.6 Intervention crew vision, values and goals miners pocket card 
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Figure 6.7 Miners in My Section are Encouraged to Find Better Ways to Do Things. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Miners in My Section are Proficient at Their Job.  
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Figure 6.9 My Crew Members Can Depend on Me.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.10 I Am Familiar with the Strengths and Weaknesses of My Crew Members. 
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Figure 6.11 I am Held Accountable for My Responsibilities. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12 Everyone in My Section is Held Accountable for Their Responsibilities. 
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Figure 6.13 Intervention Crew Changes in Leadership Climate 
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Figure 6.14 Nonintervention Crew Changes in Leadership Climate 
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Figure 6.15 Intervention Crew Changes in Perception of Psychological Empowerment 
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Figure 6.16 Nonintervention Crew Changes in Psychological Empowermen
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Figure 6.17 Intervention Crew Production in Tons Per Hour of Run Time. 
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Figure 6.18 Intervention Crew Production in Tons Per Shift 
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Figure 6.19 Nonintervention Crew Production in Tons Per Shift. 
 
 
 
 
0.00
200.00
400.00
600.00
800.00
1,000.00
1,200.00
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 in
 T
o
n
s 
Shfit Date 
Nonintervention Crew Production in Tons/Shift 
66 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.20 Nonintervention Crew Production in Tons Per Hour of Run Time. 
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Figure 6.21 Miners Can Shut Down Work if it’s Unsafe or if Other Problems Arise. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.22 Unsafe Acts Are Not Tolerated by Miners in My Section. 
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Figure 6.23 Hazards in my section are corrected in an appropriate amount of time.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.24 Miners in My Crew Work Just as Safely When the Direct Supervisor is Not 
Around. 
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Figure 6.25 Miners are Responsible for Their Own Safety in My Section. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.26 The Equipment in My Section is Properly Maintained. 
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Figure 6.27 Workers at This Mine Sometimes Take Unnecessary Risk to Get the Job 
Done. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.28 My Decisions Effect the Safety of Other Miners in My Crew.
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
56
7
8
9
Intervention Crew 
Pre-
Intervention
Mid-
Intervention
Post-
Intervention
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
56
7
8
9
Nonintervention Crew 
Pre-
Intervention
Mid-
Intervention
Post-
Intervention
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
56
7
8
9
Intervention Crew 
Pre-
Intervention
Mid-
Intervention
Post-
Intervention
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
56
7
8
9
Nonintervention Crew 
Pre-
Intervention
Mid-
Intervention
Post-
Intervention
  
      
7
1 
 
 
Figure 6.29 Intervention Crew Safety Perception 
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
Miners can shut 
down work if it’s 
unsafe or if other 
problems arise. 
Unsafe acts are
not tolerated by
miners in my
section.
Hazards in my
section are
corrected in an
appropriate
amount of time
Miners in my crew
work just as safely
when the direct
supervisor is not
around.
Miners are
responsible for
their own safety in
my section.
The equipment
used in my section
is properly
maintained.
Workers at this
mine sometimes
take unnecessary
risk to get the job
done.
My decisions
effect the safety
of other miners in
my crew.
R
es
p
o
n
se
s 
Questions 
Intervention Crew Safety Perception 
Preintervention Midintervention Postintervention
  
      
7
2 
 
Figure 6.30 Nonintervention Crew Safety Perception 
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Figure 6.31 Situational Safety Awareness for the Intervention Crew. 
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Figure 6.32 Situational Safety Awareness for the Nonintervention Crew.
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Figure 6.33 Situational Awareness for the Intervention Crew 
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Figure 6.34 Situational Awareness for the Nonintervention Crew
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
 
7.1 Hypothesis0 
Ho: An increase in leadership climate through training and implementation of a 
variant of distributive leadership correlates to a positive change in psychological 
empowerment among individual miners in an underground coal mining section.  
Survey responses regarding perception of leadership qualities that define shared 
leadership, i.e., a dynamic interactive influence process among individuals in groups, for 
which the objective is to lead one another to the achievement of group or organizational 
goals or both (Pearce and Conger 2003), indicated that overall, miners received fewer 
opportunities to participate in the crew’s decision making process, which nullifies 
hypothesis0; see Figure 6.1.  
Positive and negative changes in shared leadership can be argued. The pre-
intervention survey responses represented a consensus of empowerment among miners to 
make decisions (see Figure 6.1), and a positive perception of accountability and 
responsibility (see Figure 6.15).  A majority of the miners could not explain the 
difference between accountability and responsibility before receiving leadership training. 
Before the intervention, miners developed a sense of confidence in performing individual 
routine tasks, and making decisions regarding those tasks. When charged with making 
decisions outside those routine tasks, i.e., decisions that affected outcomes for the whole 
section, the perception of shared leadership decreased. It is likely that this was due to an 
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increased awareness of the foreman’s responsibilities and control over the section prior to 
the intervention. Overall the increase in awareness of responsibilities between the miners, 
fire boss, and foreman, resembled a positive change in leadership climate. This awareness 
of responsibilities outside of individual routine tasks is a primary step in leadership 
development and indicator that some preliminary form of shared leadership was being 
enacted among the crewmembers. 
A key learning point from this study is that leadership development requires 
varying amounts of time, effort, resources, and support from multiple levels in an 
organization. While shared leadership was implemented at the individual and frontline 
supervisor levels, upper management and shift supervisors were practicing routine 
methods of management that were counterproductive to shared leadership. Further 
research will help to define the organizational level within a mining operation where the 
traditional hierarchical methods of leadership should meet methods of shared or 
distributive leadership, and determine the most effective traditional hierarchical 
leadership models or competencies that support the implementation and development of 
shared leadership.  
In addition to the evidence that some preliminary form of shared leadership was 
occurring in the section, interviews, observations, and the intervention diary, indicate an 
overall increase in leadership climate, contrary to decrease calculated in the statistical 
analysis of the perception surveys. The significant decrease in perception of traits used to 
define the leadership climate construct, i.e., trust, communication, task proficiency, 
dependability, and accountability, represent an initial step in the process of leadership 
development, which indicates an increase in leadership climate. The study design 
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included metrics to observe significant changes in leadership climate as a whole, but did 
not include metrics to identify the preliminary and incremental stages of development 
that occurred during the intervention. The possibility of a type II error is relevant in a 
replication of this study with more participants, though a legitimate time-series design 
over six-months to a year will account for significant changes.  
Certain increases and decreases in psychological empowerment may also support 
the argument of an increase in leadership climate. Again, responses taken through mid-
intervention and postintervention surveys (after the leadership training), indicate a 
decrease in perception of job impact and increase in perception of job meaningfulness. 
The shift in Likert scale responses to the statement, “I have considerable opportunity for 
freedom and independence in how I do my job,” and “my impact on what happens in my 
section is large,” was approximately minus one or 16% (see Figure 6.17). This is a 
significant change in perception considering the sample size, and could support the 
argument of an increased awareness of job responsibilities and accountability among the 
miners, fire boss, and foreman. Whereby this also supports nullification of hypothesis0, it 
is evident that the intervention was not effectively implemented. Responses taken from 
the nonintervention crew remained mostly uniform through the pre-, mid-, and post-
intervention surveys. This proved to be useful for comparing and analyzing the changes 
in responses of the intervention crew. 
A replication of this intervention with the duration lasting six months to a year, 
and with additional time series measures, is likely to render more conclusive results. 
Also, additional logistical support (i.e., financing for travel and time, and additional 
personnel) would provide a means for a more thorough implementation of the leadership 
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structure. Confounding factors beyond control of the intervention administrators would 
still remain an issue, such as the negative political outlook on the future of coal in the 
United States, and increased demand for production amidst other prohibiting factors such 
as worn down equipment, cuts in incentives, and environmental hazards. 
 
7.2 Hypothesis1 
 
H1: An increase in psychological empowerment correlates positively to a change 
in productivity, perception towards safety and situational awareness among individual 
miners in an underground coal mining section. 
Considering the nullification of Hypothesis0, no correlation can be determined for 
psychological empowerment as a whole with productivity, safety, or situational 
awareness. Productivity decreased, but this was due to the year-end schedule, holidays, 
and employees using vacation. The intervention and nonintervention crews performed at 
different and varying levels of hourly production, but the duration of the intervention was 
not long enough to record a sufficient amount of data to determine any conclusive trends. 
A major recommendation for the replication of this study would be to incorporate a 
longer time-series design, more than one year if possible. 
Responses to questions regarding perception of safety did indicate some positive 
changes in perception among the intervention crew. Mainly, there was an increase of 
individual responsibility for safety and a decrease in overall willingness of miners to take 
risk to get the job done; see Figure 6.31. The nonintervention crew also indicated a 
positive change in perception of individual responsibility for safety, though less than the 
intervention crew, by .3 on the Likert scale. Also, where the intervention crew indicated a 
decrease in willingness of miners to take risk in getting the job done, the nonintervention 
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crew reported an increase. This is significant considering the increased demand for 
production for both crews in the section.  
Responses to questions from the miner survey regarding situational awareness 
showed only slight changes in perception; see Figures 6.35 and 6.36. The questions were 
intended to supplement data collected through the situational safety awareness survey 
provided by Psyfactors, Ltd., which also indicated only slight changes in perception of 
situational awareness. If this survey was completed by the miners within the confounds of 
the intent it was designed for (i.e., to determine the cognitive abilities of a potential 
employee), a stronger effort may have been given, and thus, more reliable data produced. 
 
7.3 Summary 
 
Considering the complexity of challenges in the mining industry and improved 
standards for acceptable risk, innovation must exceed the means of technology and 
typical linear engineering solutions. The stability of mining operations no longer depends 
on the willingness of workers to sacrifice in extremely hazardous conditions. The modern 
workforce must be empowered, situationally aware, decisive, and able communicators. 
Though this intervention was conducted at a small level and the quantifiable outcomes 
were not significant, this research unravels a multitude of possibilities for both innovation 
and safety through leadership development. 
The qualitative data collected during the interviews and observations provided 
evidence of the importance and transitional nature of psychological empowerment. This 
is significant, when considering a higher standard for safety in the mining industry. While 
any mine operator would hopefully vouch for the ability of their employees to “stop 
unsafe work,” traditional methods of management and leadership are counterproductive 
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to empowering employees with any voice regarding the nature of their work, that being 
overall safe practices and identification of potential hazards, or process improvements.   
A replication of this study would benefit from an increased duration of the 
intervention, while maintaining a time series design, additional research administrators to 
effectively implement the intervention, and a larger, more randomly selected cohort. The 
cohort in this study was behind budget on production and was selected by mine 
management based on their need for improvement. This combination of confounding 
factors made the intervention very difficult to implement. Also, utilization of a larger 
cohort that is not under the same pressure to increase production and selected with the 
intent to improve perceived poor attitudes, will prove more useful for validating data and 
other outcomes against other inevitable confounding factors.  
Future research in the mining industry would be beneficial from more in-depth 
investigations of the relationship between leadership and situational awareness. In the 
military, leadership serves as a platform that enables a learning culture-which is capable 
of adapting, to efficiently manage crisis. This ability to adapt requires a decentralization 
of authority and has been described as imperative for U.S. Joint Special Operations Task 
Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq (McChrystal et al. 2015). In crisis, adaptive 
organizational responses require the ability to quickly transform organizational structures 
and decentralize, rather than relying on hierarchy and centralized autonomy (Grabowski 
and Roberts 2016).  
The question is, do high-risk environments and crisis-situations compare? Can the 
same leadership applications used to establish a learning culture in high reliability 
organizations prove to be effective in other high-risk industries? This application of 
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leadership is one of many that may be effective. In addition to improvements in study 
design, alternate approaches to the study’s implementation could be useful, such as 
focusing more on the small unit, providing training based on the same traits and 
principles to front-line managers, and team leaders through-out an entire mine.  
 
7.4 List of Observations from the Study 
 
1. The qualitative data collected during the interviews and observations provided 
evidence of the importance and transitional nature of psychological 
empowerment. 
2. A majority of the miners could not explain the difference between 
accountability and responsibility before receiving leadership training. 
3. There was an increase of individual responsibility for safety and a decrease in 
overall willingness of miners to take risk to get the job done. 
4. There was an increased awareness of job responsibilities and accountability 
among the miners, fire boss, and foreman. 
5. Targeting the small unit level rather than individuals may be more effective 
for implementing leadership development in future. 
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MINERS POCKET GUIDE TO SHARED LEADERSHIP 
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MINER PERCEPTION SURVEY VERSION 1.4 
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SITUATIONAL SAFETY AWARENESS SURVEY VERSION 5.0p 
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